Naval War College Review
Volume 71
Number 4 Autumn

Article 14

2018

Seablindness: How Political Neglect Is Choking
American Seapower and What to Do about It
Sean Sullivan
Seth Cropsey

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Sullivan, Sean and Cropsey, Seth (2018) "Seablindness: How Political Neglect Is Choking American Seapower and What to Do about
It," Naval War College Review: Vol. 71 : No. 4 , Article 14.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/14

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

150

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Sullivan and Cropsey: Seablindness: How Political Neglect Is Choking American Seapower

since the Navy’s inception still sufficed.
But by 1880 the focus had shifted
from imperial constabulary duties
to national defense as “the essential
foundation of naval policy” (p. 143).
While most historians tie the renaissance of the U.S. Navy to the nation’s
imperialist expansion around the
turn of the twentieth century, Mobley
asserts that the birth of the modern
American navy predated this imperialist
surge—perhaps even facilitating it.
Navy progressives were divided in
their approach to advancing the Navy.
One branch focused on harnessing
technology, while the other advocated
the study of strategy. As an ardent voice
for technology, Lieutenant Bradley A.
Fiske advocated for developing ships
with the latest technology, to stand up
to the more advanced European navies.
At the opposite end of the progressive
movement, Rear Admiral Stephen B.
Luce founded the Naval War College
in 1884 to ensure that the officer corps
studied not only emerging technology
but also the art and science of war. These
two branches of progressivism “clashed
between 1887 and 1897 in a series of
bureaucratic and cultural struggles, with
the Naval War College their primary
battleground” (p. 207). Despite their
differences, however, “the two cultures
complemented each other in many
ways. . . . Indeed, many officers readily
embraced both perspectives” (p. 207).
Using Harold L. Wilensky’s professionalization model, Mobley tracks how
the U.S. naval officer corps established
its professional credentials. The final
step involved the establishment of
the U.S. Naval Institute and the Naval
War College as forums for debating
ideas. Prior to the 1873 founding of
the Naval Institute, no forum existed
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for professional discussion within the
naval service. The institute was open to
all officers; the founders hoped that the
inclusion of many voices would advance
the profession as a whole. Mobley
claims that—contrary to historiography
regarding this era holding that naval
education existed only at the intellectual fringes—“the early Naval War
College mirrored the progressive trends
shaping new graduate schools and social
science disciplines in the United States
during the Gilded Age” (pp. 182–83).
Many of the lessons Mobley identifies
can inform today’s warrior-engineer
debate. As the information age matures
and the robotics age emerges, America’s
navy faces new technological and strategic challenges. Those who trust technology to dominate future warfare and
those who argue for the continued need
to study the science of war continue to
clash, just as they did over a century ago.
Lieutenant William Bainbridge-Hoff ’s
observation rings as validly today as
when he uttered it in 1886: “[W]ellconstructed strategy must consider
technology, just as technology should be
informed by strategy” (p. 207). For this
reason, those desiring to advance the
naval profession should read this book.
JAMES P. MCGRATH III

Seablindness: How Political Neglect Is Choking
American Seapower and What to Do about It, by
Seth Cropsey. New York: Encounter Books, 2017.
408 pages. $27.99.

In Seablindness, Seth Cropsey delivers a
comprehensive examination of sea power and makes a compelling argument for
the modernization and recapitalization
of the U.S. Navy. To do so he analyzes
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the future security environment, the
projected use and requirements of the
Navy, and the current state of readiness
within the sea services. Seablindness
serves as a cautionary reminder to U.S.
leadership and the American people
regarding the mandate of sea power for
maritime states. Cropsey provides short
historical examples of the actions and
decisions that led to the diminution
of the power and influence of earlier
powerful maritime states and the international and domestic consequences.
These analogies provoke reflection on
the current state of U.S. sea power.
Cropsey defines seablindness as a mindset under which great maritime powers
“forget, neglect,” or are “distracted”
from the oceanic foundation of their
commerce and security. It manifests its
effects in national security policy and
defense resource-allocation decisions
that incrementally weaken the ability of
the state to employ sea power, including
its navy, in the promotion, protection,
and defense of state interests. These
policy and budget actions rarely are
intended to diminish the capability or
effectiveness of maritime forces; rather,
the degradation is more an unintended
consequence of seemingly unrelated
policy actions or political objectives.
The author develops the urgency to
make national security decisions and
take action to remedy seablindness
through a methodical and logical analysis of current and future maritime strategies, missions, operating concepts, and
forces. This book is more than an argument for a larger naval force structure; it
represents as well an opportunity for the
reader to reflect on sea power and the
employment of a navy, so as to form an
answer to the question: “What does the
nation need and want its navy to do?”
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The author presents five core strategic
missions of the U.S. Navy. The service’s
first priority is to use the nuclear triad
to deter nuclear war. Second, the Navy
must be able to conduct sustained
and complex maritime warfare from
the sea. The third priority is to deter
and respond immediately to regional
conflicts and challenges. Fourth, the
Navy needs to conduct global surveillance through forward deployment,
and to respond to crises. Lastly, the
Navy provides extended coastal defense
that keeps potential adversaries at
greater distances from the United States.
This list of core missions reflects the
orthodoxy of American sea power,
captures the enduring elements of the
missions of the U.S. Navy, and is a clear
expression of the purpose of the service.
The book presents a comprehensive
assessment of the conditions that have
affected matériel and personnel readiness within the naval force structure
over the last two decades. Cropsey’s
examination of sea power evaluates
the complex interrelationships among
force structure, strategy, operational
employment, and readiness. He explains
in detail the cascading effects on the
Navy and Marine Corps, and on the
men and women who serve therein,
from reductions in force structure,
prolonged deployments, deferred or
truncated maintenance periods, and
expedited predeployment training.
Using descriptive regional security
scenarios, Cropsey presents plausible
future situations and describes how
and why potential adversaries such as
China, Russia, and Iran would take
actions in their regions in pursuit of
their own national interests, thereby
threatening U.S. partner states, regional
stability, and U.S. national interests.
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The author uses these scenarios to
demonstrate how a U.S. maritime
response to regional aggression could
be constrained or limited by diminished
Navy and Marine Corps force structures
and postures. Thus, these scenarios
examine the potential vulnerabilities
that have resulted from seablindness.
Cropsey recommends that the Trump
administration conduct a comprehensive
assessment of American sea power to determine the “goals, size, and character”
of the U.S. Navy. In two chapters entitled
“Rebuilding American Seapower” and
“Naval Rearmament,” Cropsey’s analysis
frames the naval force structure alternatives facing the Trump administration,
Congress, and naval force planners. The
author evaluates President Trump’s 2016
350-ship campaign goal by comparing
it with the Navy’s 2017 thirty-year
shipbuilding plan of 308 ships and
the 2015 Congressional Budget Office
assessment of Navy shipbuilding.
Cropsey makes recommendations for
changes in force posture, naval operating
concepts, and force structure programming. He determines that the United
States has the industrial capability and
resources to build a 350-ship Navy—if
the Trump administration effectively
advocates for sea power, and if Congress
establishes sea power as a priority.
Seablindness delivers a candid and
uniquely comprehensive examination
of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
by first assessing the past and current
uses of American sea power and
analyzing force-structure requirements, then considering the future
security environment, naval missions
in general, and particular employment options for the U.S. Navy.
SEAN SULLIVAN
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Neglected Skies: The Demise of British Naval
Power in the Far East, 1922–42, by Angus Britts.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 253
pages. $34.95.

Although the author describes his
work as a “reconsideration” of the April
1942 clash between the British Eastern
Fleet and the Imperial Japanese Navy’s
Kido Butai (1st Mobile Force), this is
probably something of a stretch. Britts’s
main conclusion—that the neglect
of naval aviation during the interwar
years resulted in a Royal Navy that was
uncompetitive when matched against
the combat-seasoned and well-drilled
multicarrier task force fielded by
Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo—is
hardly earth-shattering. Nor indeed
are his explanations for this lapse:
the obsolescence of both platforms
and thinking in the Royal Navy; and
the almost criminal squandering of
a comprehensive early lead in naval
aviation, a degradation brought about by
parochial infighting within Whitehall,
set against the chronic underfunding
of the navy in particular. To my mind,
to be considered a true reconsideration
a work would have to offer significant
new perspectives, new evidence, or a
novel interpretation of an established set
of events. Unfortunately, and notwithstanding a few fanciful counterfactuals,
Britts does none of these things.
For a start, while the author in his
second and third chapters conducts a
thorough scrutiny of the policy-making
rationale employed and the pitfalls of
that approach, he does not back it up
with a detailed analysis of the detrimental impact the “dual control” system
had on comprehensive development of
naval aviation as a warfare discipline.
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